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Disincentive Effects of Evaluation

Author

Listed:
  • Raphael Boleslavsky

    (University of Miami)

  • Bruce Carlin

    (UCLA)

  • Christopher Cotton

    (Queen's University)

Abstract

In a model of project design, evaluation, and selection, we explore how the incentives to improve the design of projects depend on the availability of funding and the process of evaluation. We show that project designers (researchers or NGOs) prefer to subject their projects to less-rigorous evaluations than donors or funding agencies would prefer, ex-post. We also show how an increase in either funding availability or the informativeness of evaluations tends to decrease investments in project quality. By implication, increased availability of funding or more-informative evaluations can lead to the implementation of fewer high-value projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2019. "Disincentive Effects of Evaluation," Working Paper 1410, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1410
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/wpaper/qed_wp_1410.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Impact evaluation; Pilot studies; Funding allocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
    • O22 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Project Analysis

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