IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pri/indrel/436.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Who Gets Good Jobs? The Hiring Decisions and Compensation Structures of Large Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Luojia Hu

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

The firm-specific human capital theory implies that large firms prefer to hire younger workers because they invest more in workers than small firms do and because those investments are fixed costs. In this paper, I use data from the Benefits Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) to demonstrate that large firms indeed hire younger workers than small firms, especially for white-collar occupations. I present a simple model of firm cost minimization within an employee search framework, which is consistent with large firms' propensity to hire younger workers, and has additional testable implications regarding large firms' compensation structures. First, since young workers are more valuable to large firms than to small firms, large firms ofier higher starting wages to attract them. This implies flatter starting wage-age profiles among the new hires in large firms. Second, since large firms invest more in workers, they continue to pay higher wages to retain the trained employees. This implies steeper wage-tenure profiles in large firms. Both predictions are borne out by the CPS data. Most strikingly, for the newly hired white-collar workers, not only are the starting wage-age profiles flatter in large finns, but also the size-wage premium disappears for workers hired at age 35 or older. Furthermore, by exploiting cost variations in dimensions other than firm size, such as occupation and industry, this model has additional testable implications. More specifically, an extension of the simple model would imply that, for high training occupations, workers displaced at older ages suffer greater wage losses than younger workers because they have a harder time finding a new good job that requires high investments. But there should be no systematic difference in wage loss by age for occupations that require little training. This prediction is supported by the data from the Displaced Worker Surveys. Finally, limited evidence from the BLS Survey of Employer Provided Training 1995 and the CPS suggests that industries that train more also appear to hire younger workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Luojia Hu, 2000. "Who Gets Good Jobs? The Hiring Decisions and Compensation Structures of Large Firms," Working Papers 815, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  • Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:436
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp01pr76f3411/1/436.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luojia Hu, 2003. "The Hiring Decisions and Compensation Structures of Large Firms," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(4), pages 663-681, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    firm specific; human capital; job search; compensation; firm size;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bobray Bordelon (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/irprius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.