Health Insurance Menu Design for Large Employers
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- Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, 2023. "Health insurance menu design for large employers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(4), pages 598-637, December.
- Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, 2020. "Health Insurance Menu Design for Large Employers," NBER Working Papers 27868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
- Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015.
"The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
- Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert Town, 2014. "The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 19800, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benjamin R. Handel & Kate Ho, 2021. "Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 29137, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nicholas Tilipman, 2022. "Employer Incentives and Distortions in Health Insurance Design: Implications for Welfare and Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(3), pages 998-1037, March.
- Michael J. Dickstein & Kate Ho & Nathaniel Mark, 2021. "Market Segmentation and Competition in Health Insurance," Working Papers 2021-93, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Gallone, Emma Luisa & Ravetto Enri, Lorenzo & Pignata, Irene & Baratta, Francesca & Brusa, Paola, 2020. "The 2017 deregulation of pharmacies in Italy: Introducing non-pharmacist ownership," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(12), pages 1281-1286.
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More about this item
Keywords
Health insurance; Health care;JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2022-03-21 (Banking)
- NEP-HEA-2022-03-21 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2022-03-21 (Insurance Economics)
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