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The Unfinished Business of State-owned Enterprise Reform in the People’s Republic of China

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  • Holz, Carsten A.

Abstract

This paper examines the progress of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in the People’s Republic of China. After defining SOEs and considering their scope of operation within the PRC economy, the focus of the paper is on the major reform waves that followed the deterioration of SOE profitability in the early 1990s. The oil industry serves to illustrate industry-specific SOE reform trends as well as the latest reform developments. Until today, a stable, successful, long-term arrangement of state ownership has remained elusive. SOE reform is incomplete as long as a number of fundamental governance issues are not resolved. But these are difficult to resolve in the context of Party-controlled state-owned enterprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Holz, Carsten A., 2018. "The Unfinished Business of State-owned Enterprise Reform in the People’s Republic of China," MPRA Paper 94093, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:94093
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul H. Malatesta & Kathryn L. DeWenter, 2001. "State-Owned and Privately Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 320-334, March.
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    3. Mr. Waikei R Lam & Mr. Alfred Schipke & Yuyan Tan & Zhibo Tan, 2017. "Resolving China's Zombies: Tackling Debt and Raising Productivity," IMF Working Papers 2017/266, International Monetary Fund.
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    5. Xu, Xiaonian & Wang, Yan, 1999. "Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 75-98.
    6. McNally Christopher A., 2002. "Strange Bedfellows: Communist Party Institutions and New Governance Mechanisms in Chinese State Holding Corporations," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-26, April.
    7. McNally, Christopher A., 2002. "Strange Bedfellows: Communist Party Institutions and New Governance Mechanisms in Chinese State Holding Corporations," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 91-115, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Jing & Li, Liyao & Liu, Shimeng, 2022. "Attenuation of agglomeration economies: Evidence from the universe of Chinese manufacturing firms," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    2. Hsu, Sara & Fan, Zhihao, 2022. "Policy and media forces that shape the creation of Chinese state-owned enterprise policies," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 44(6), pages 1232-1250.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State-owned enterprise reform; People’s Republic of China; corporate governance; public enterprise management; Chinese Communist Party; state-owned asset management; industrial policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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