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Kartele i patenty a nakłady badawczo-rozwojowe przedsiębiorstw
[Cartels and patents, and R&D expenditures of companies]

Author

Listed:
  • Karbowski, Adam
  • Prokop, Jacek

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of R&D cartel, full industry cartel, and patents on process innovation of companies, and consumer surplus, and total welfare. The reference scenario is here the Cournot rivalry without patent protection of inventions. In this paper, the quadratic costs of production of goods and R&D investments are assumed. The results of modelling and numerical analyses allowed to state that R&D cooperation (in the form of R&D cartel) is more effective and socially preferred instrument to stimulate innovation in the industry than interfirm rivalry motivated by patents. However, in industries characterized by relatively weak or medium knowledge spillovers, the most effective tool to enhance innovation is interfirm rivalry without patents. The latter constitutes one more argument against patents.

Suggested Citation

  • Karbowski, Adam & Prokop, Jacek, 2018. "Kartele i patenty a nakłady badawczo-rozwojowe przedsiębiorstw [Cartels and patents, and R&D expenditures of companies]," MPRA Paper 90181, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:90181
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2013. "The Case against Patents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 3-22, Winter.
    2. Adam Karbowski, 2015. "Kartele w trzech perspektywach: neoklasycznej, behawioralnej oraz etycznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 5-26.
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    5. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    research and development; patents; cartels; Cournot competition; quadratic costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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