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Quality competition in healthcare services with regional regulators: A differential game approach

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  • Bisceglia, Michele
  • Cellini, Roberto
  • Grilli, Luca

Abstract

This article proposes a differential-game model, in order to analyze markets in which regional regulation is operative and competition is based on quality. The case we have in mind is healthcare public service, where consumers (patients) choose the provider mainly basing on the providers' location and the quality of services, while prices play a more limited role. In most European countries, within the same State, regional (or local) providers compete on quality to attract demand. Market regulation is set at national and/or regional level. Our model highlights the features of equilibrium in such a framework, and specifically investigates how the differences in product quality evolve among regions, and how inter-regional demand flows behave. Differently from some available similar models (that do not take into account the regional dimension of the decision process), we find that quality differentials among regions may persist in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Bisceglia, Michele & Cellini, Roberto & Grilli, Luca, 2017. "Quality competition in healthcare services with regional regulators: A differential game approach," MPRA Paper 81758, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:81758
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cellini, Roberto & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2018. "A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 190-206.
    2. Brekke, Kurt R. & Levaggi, Rosella & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2014. "Patient mobility, health care quality and welfare," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 140-157.
    3. Kurt R. Brekke & Roberto Cellini & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2012. "Competition in Regulated Markets with Sluggish Beliefs about Quality," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 131-178, March.
    4. Kurt R. Brekke & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2011. "Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113, pages 444-469, June.
    5. Michele Bisceglia & Roberto Cellini & Luca Grilli, 2018. "Regional regulators in health care service under quality competition: A game theoretical model," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(11), pages 1821-1842, November.
    6. Brekke, Kurt R. & Levaggi, Rosella & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2016. "Patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 372-387.
    7. Jun, Byoung & Vives, Xavier, 2004. "Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 249-281, June.
    8. Levaggi, R. & Moretto, M. & Pertile, P., 2012. "Static and dynamic efficiency of irreversible health care investments under alternative payment rules," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 169-179.
    9. Siciliani, Luigi & Rune Straume, Odd & Cellini, Roberto, 2013. "Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 2041-2061.
    10. Brekke, Kurt R. & Cellini, Roberto & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2010. "Competition and quality in health care markets: A differential-game approach," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 508-523, July.
    11. Roberto Cellini & Fabio Lamantia, 2015. "Quality competition in markets with regulated prices and minimum quality standards," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 345-370, April.
    12. Levaggi, Rosella & Moretto, Michele & Pertile, Paolo, 2014. "Two-part payments for the reimbursement of investments in health technologies," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 230-236.
    13. Silvia Balia & Rinaldo Brau & Emanuela Marrocu, 2014. "What Drives Patient Mobility Across Italian Regions? Evidence from Hospital Discharge Data," Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy, in: Rosella Levaggi & Marcello Montefiori (ed.), Health Care Provision and Patient Mobility, edition 127, pages 133-154, Springer.
    14. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Bisceglia & Roberto Cellini & Luca Grilli, 2022. "On the dynamic optimality of yardstick regulation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 315(1), pages 73-92, August.
    2. Ma, Shigui & He, Yong & Gu, Ran & Yeh, Chung-Hsing, 2024. "How to cooperate in a three-tier food delivery service supply chain," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Bisceglia, Michele & Cellini, Roberto & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2020. "Optimal dynamic volume-based price regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Bisceglia, Michele & Cellini, Roberto & Grilli, Luca, 2019. "On the optimality of the yardstick regulation in the presence of dynamic interaction," MPRA Paper 94946, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Okuyama, Suzuka, 2021. "Price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly : Differential game approach," MPRA Paper 110148, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Oct 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Healthcare Services; Diffrential Game; Quality Competition; � Regional Regulators.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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