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Static and Dynamic Efficiency of Irreversible Health Care Investments under Alternative Payment Rules

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  • Levaggi, Rosella
  • Moretto, Michele
  • Pertile, Paolo

Abstract

The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured both in the timing of adoption (dynamic) and the intensity of use of the technology (static). If the second instrument is unavailable, a trade-off may emerge between static and dynamic efficiency. In this context, we also discuss how the regulator could use the control of the level of uncertainty faced by the provider as an instrument to mitigate the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Finally, the model is calibrated to study a specific technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Levaggi, Rosella & Moretto, Michele & Pertile, Paolo, 2010. "Static and Dynamic Efficiency of Irreversible Health Care Investments under Alternative Payment Rules," Institutions and Markets Papers 98047, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemim:98047
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.98047
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    1. Levaggi, R. & Moretto, M. & Pertile, P., 2012. "Static and dynamic efficiency of irreversible health care investments under alternative payment rules," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 169-179.
    2. Cellini, Roberto & Lisi, Domenico, 2019. "Readmission treatment price and product quality in the hospital sector: A note," MPRA Paper 92505, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ghandour, Ziad & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2022. "Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    4. Xidong Guo, 2024. "An analysis of a rural hospital's investment decision under different payment systems," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(4), pages 714-747, April.
    5. Michele Bisceglia & Roberto Cellini & Luca Grilli, 2018. "Regional regulators in health care service under quality competition: A game theoretical model," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(11), pages 1821-1842, November.
    6. Barros Pedro Pita & Martinez-Giralt Xavier, 2015. "Technological Adoption in Health Care – The Role of Payment Systems," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 709-745, April.
    7. Rosella Levaggi & Michele Moretto & Paolo Pertile, 2023. "Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services," Working Papers 2023.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Rosella Levaggi & Michele Moretto & Paolo Pertile, 2012. "DRGs: the link between investment in technologies and appropriateness," Working Papers 31/2012, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    9. Brekke, Kurt R. & Levaggi, Rosella & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2016. "Patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 372-387.
    10. Michele Bisceglia & Roberto Cellini & Luca Grilli, 2019. "Quality Competition in Healthcare Services with Regional Regulators: A Differential Game Approach," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 1-23, March.
    11. Rosella Levaggi & Michele Moretto & Paolo Pertile, 2017. "The Dynamics of Pharmaceutical Regulation and R&D Investments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(1), pages 121-141, February.
    12. Laurence C. Baker & Karine Lamiraud, 2022. "Adoption of hospital diagnosis‐related group financing in Switzerland and the availability of computed tomography scanners," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(12), pages 2537-2557, December.
    13. Roberto Cellini & Domenico Lisi, 2020. "Readmission treatment price and product quality in the hospital sector," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 61-71, January.
    14. Levaggi, Rosella & Moretto, Michele & Pertile, Paolo, 2014. "Two-part payments for the reimbursement of investments in health technologies," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 230-236.
    15. Annie Tubadji & Vassilis Angelis & Peter Nijkamp, 2016. "Endogenous intangible resources and their place in the institutional hierarchy," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 36(1), pages 1-28, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Health Economics and Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing

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