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Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders

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  • Matsumura, Toshihiro
  • Yamagishi, Atsushi

Abstract

We investigate a free-entry market in which incumbents engage in lobbying for changing regulations, which affect the cost of all firms equally. We find that incumbents have incentive to weaken or strengthen regulations, depending on the demand condition.

Suggested Citation

  • Matsumura, Toshihiro & Yamagishi, Atsushi, 2016. "Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders," MPRA Paper 75624, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:75624
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matsumura, Toshihiro & Yamagishi, Atsushi, 2017. "Long-run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 64-68.
    2. Yamagishi Atsushi, 2016. "Consumers’ Misevaluation and Public Promotion," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-5, October.
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    5. Hiroaki Ino & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2012. "How Many Firms Should Be Leaders? Beneficial Concentration Revisited," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1323-1340, November.
    6. Lee, Sang-Ho, 1999. "Optimal Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists with Endogenous Market Structure," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 293-308, May.
    7. Toshihiro Matsumura & Osamu Kanda, 2005. "Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 27-48, February.
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    12. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
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    14. Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Commodity taxation and imperfect competition : A note on the effects of entry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 359-367, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2020. "Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 181-187.
    2. Susumu Cato & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2019. "Entry License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 175(2), pages 258-271.
    3. Junichi Haraguchi & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2021. "Profit‐enhancing entries in mixed oligopolies," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(1), pages 33-55, July.
    4. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2019. "To favor more or less? Corporate lobbying over preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 334-357, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobbying; common costs; free entry market; Stackelberg; regulation costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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