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The limits of wise exploitation in dependent and independent symmetric ensembles

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  • Friedrich, Thomas

Abstract

Selfish motivated violence and deception are considered as harmful to the performance of a group; therefore, should have negative effects in animal and human societies and are thus condemned as amoral in human societies. Here, I investigate more deeply a recently discovered ethos (i.e. the characteristic spirit of a culture) called wise exploitation. In an ensemble with this ethos violence and deception are an essential part of the success, explaining the organized occurrence of both. The transfer of substrate from source to sink induced by violence and deception will be superadditive within certain limits. In case this superadditivity is able to pay all investments like brute force, deception, reciprocity, information costs, transfer costs, at least one surviving offspring and a premium, the transfer is called wise and will be better in comparison to no transfer and simple additivity. In comparison to the weaker and peaceful ensembles, wise exploitation is active in a different part of substrate availability. This ethos will not end in the Nash equilibrium because biologic systems are open systems continuously powered by the sun. The exploited party will not be lost as offspring will continue the function as a source of benefits or as a sink of costs. In case there is no genetic tradition there will be a tradition of functionality organized.

Suggested Citation

  • Friedrich, Thomas, 2015. "The limits of wise exploitation in dependent and independent symmetric ensembles," MPRA Paper 68250, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:68250
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Friedrich, T., 2009. "Wise exploitation – a game with a higher productivity than cooperation – transforms biological productivity into economic productivity," MPRA Paper 22862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Friedrich, Thomas, 2014. "Work cycles of independent ensembles," MPRA Paper 55090, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Friedrich, Thomas & Köpper, Wilhelm, 2013. "Schumpeter´s Gale: Mixing and compartmentalization in Economics and Biology," MPRA Paper 45405, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann & Christian Thoeni, 2010. "Culture and Cooperation," Discussion Papers 2010-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friedrich, Thomas, 2018. "Evolution towards higher net profit in a population of ensembles of ensembles leads to division of labour," MPRA Paper 85517, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Friedrich, Thomas, 2024. "The positive net profit space is a subspace of the transfer space," MPRA Paper 120138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Friedrich, Thomas, 2020. "Inflation and deflation of the transfer space," MPRA Paper 103402, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Friedrich, Thomas, 2019. "Transfers by force and deception lead to stability in an evolutionary learning process when controlled by net profit but not by turnover," MPRA Paper 92724, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Friedrich, Thomas, 2019. "How peaceful is the harmony of source and sink?," MPRA Paper 96764, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Friedrich, Thomas, 2016. "Aquila non captat muscas :Homo Economicus between exploration and exploitation," MPRA Paper 75601, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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