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Rules of remuneration of material risk takers and their implementation in the European Banks

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  • Tóth, József

Abstract

According to the new rules to be applied in the European Union, data on compensation of material risk takers are to be disclosed from year 2014. This paper overviews the different expectations regarding remuneration of bank managers highlighting the requirements of European Parliament and Council. Furthermore, it analyses data of 18 European banks disclosed based on the new lawful requirements. Based on empirical study it proves there is correlation between number of material risk takers and value of total assets.

Suggested Citation

  • Tóth, József, 2015. "Rules of remuneration of material risk takers and their implementation in the European Banks," MPRA Paper 67758, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:67758
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67758/1/MPRA_paper_67758.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kevin J. Murphy, 2013. "Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: a Case Study in Unintended Consequences," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 19(4), pages 631-657, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    remuneration; compensation; bank;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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