IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/57346.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Investor-state disputes and the TTIP – is it a new challenge for corporate responsibility?

Author

Listed:
  • Waśniewski, Krzysztof

Abstract

In the broad context of responsible management, and corporate responsibility, the present paper studies the general issue of conflicts between private investors, and governments, with a particular focus on the investor-state dispute settlement through international arbitration. On the grounds of empirical research published by other scholars, particularly by Susan D. Franck, and Barbara Koremenos, the paper aims at explaining theoretically the underlying economic motives of the recent surge in the number of internationally arbitrated, investor-state disputes, and at predicting its future developments. Additionally, the theoretical findings are applied to evaluate some of the possible, institutional outcomes of the prospective Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The general conclusion is that not only isn’t the international arbitration of investor-state disputes a threat to democracy, but also said arbitration helps to redress past infringements to public sovereignty.

Suggested Citation

  • Waśniewski, Krzysztof, 2014. "Investor-state disputes and the TTIP – is it a new challenge for corporate responsibility?," MPRA Paper 57346, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57346
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57346/1/MPRA_paper_57346.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Barbara Koremenos, 2007. "If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 189-212, January.
    3. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    4. Marvin Berhold, 1971. "A Theory of Linear Profit-Sharing Incentives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(3), pages 460-482.
    5. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    6. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 761-799, October.
    7. Koremenos, Barbara & Snidal, Duncan, 2003. "Moving Forward, One Step at a Time," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 431-444, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Waśniewski, Krzysztof, 2014. "Public debt, fiscal decisions and political power," MPRA Paper 59635, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Waśniewski, Krzysztof, 2014. "The future of aid is in building legitimation," MPRA Paper 60071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. David R. Williams & Betty S. Coffey & Carlton C. Young, 2018. "Human capital and agency effects on CEO compensation of IPO biopharmaceutical firms and the market’s response," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(2), pages 315-337, June.
    4. Wu, Zhenyu & Chua, Jess H. & Chrisman, James J., 2007. "Effects of family ownership and management on small business equity financing," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 875-895, November.
    5. Wang, Sen & Bogle, Tim & van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 2012. "Forestry and the New Institutional Economics," Working Papers 130818, University of Victoria, Resource Economics and Policy.
    6. David Gindis, 0. "On the origins, meaning and influence of Jensen and Meckling’s definition of the firm," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 966-984.
    7. An, Suwei, 2023. "Essays on incentive contracts, M&As, and firm risk," Other publications TiSEM dd97d2f5-1c9d-47c5-ba62-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Premepeh, kwadwo Boateng & Odartei-Mills, Eugene, 2015. "Corporate governance structure and shareholder wealth maximisation," MPRA Paper 68087, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Patrick Velte, 2023. "The link between corporate governance and corporate financial misconduct. A review of archival studies and implications for future research," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 353-411, February.
    10. Sareh Pouryousefi & Jeff Frooman, 2019. "The Consumer Scam: An Agency-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 1-12, January.
    11. Kovermann, Jost & Velte, Patrick, 2019. "The impact of corporate governance on corporate tax avoidance—A literature review," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-1.
    12. John M. Abowd, 1989. "Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?," NBER Working Papers 3149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Christian Brück & Jonas Ludwig & Anja Schwering, 2018. "The use of value-based management in family firms," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 383-416, February.
    14. Ji-Hyun Lee & Su-Yol Lee, 2022. "Effect of the Absence of Unethical Controlling Shareholders on Firm Value and the Moderating Role of Corporate Governance: Evidence from South Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-15, March.
    15. Ömer Tuğsal Doruk & Bahadır Ergün, 2023. "Friend or foe? The link between agency cost and financialization in Turkey," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 1689-1705, April.
    16. Sami Basly, 2006. "Propriété, décision et stratégie de l'entreprise familiale : Une analyse théorique," Post-Print halshs-00192818, HAL.
    17. Jess H. Chua & James J. Chrisman & Erich B. Bergiel, 2009. "An Agency Theoretic Analysis of the Professionalized Family Firm," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 33(2), pages 355-372, March.
    18. Gottschalg, Oliver & Berg, Achim, 2005. "Understanding value generation in buyouts," HEC Research Papers Series 824, HEC Paris.
    19. Pierre-Yves Gomez, 2003. "Jalons pour une histoire des théories du gouvernement des entreprises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(4), pages 183-208, December.
    20. Bruce Ian Carlin & Simon Gervais, 2009. "Work Ethic, Employment Contracts, and Firm Value," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 785-821, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate responsibility; public sovereignty; institutions; investor-state disputes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • F6 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57346. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.