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What do the Voters Reward: Personality, Party or Performance?

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  • Gupta, Poonam

Abstract

Election results are generally hard to predict, and India is no exception. This paper discusses the factors that are important in explaining the results of the 2009 parliamentary elections in India. Our results show that the voters prefer the candidates who have served in the parliament before, are wealthy and educated, and are affiliated with a large party. Wealth of the candidate is important not only in itself, but also in that it reduces the negative effect of “taint” associated with a candidate facing criminal charges. One important factor however, which dwarfs the effect of all other factors, is the economic performance under the incumbent state governments. Voters forcefully vote in favor of the parties which deliver high growth and reject the ones which do not.

Suggested Citation

  • Gupta, Poonam, 2013. "What do the Voters Reward: Personality, Party or Performance?," MPRA Paper 53795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:53795
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Poonam Gupta & Arvind Panagariya, 2014. "Growth and Election Outcomes in a Developing Country," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 332-354, July.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Gupta, Poonam, 2012. "How Do Indian Voters Respond to Candidates with Criminal Charges : Evidence from the 2009 Lok Sabha Elections," MPRA Paper 38417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    India; Elections;

    JEL classification:

    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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