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How Do Indian Voters Respond to Candidates with Criminal Charges : Evidence from the 2009 Lok Sabha Elections

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  • Dutta, Bhaskar
  • Gupta, Poonam

Abstract

This paper examines the response of voters to candidates who have reported that they have criminal charges against them, within the framework of a simple analytical model which assumes that criminal charges give rise to some stigma amongst the electorate, and result in a negative effect on vote shares. Campaigning, the cost of which is borne from candidates’ wealth, helps a candidate to increase his or her expected vote share by winning over the “marginal” voter. A criminal candidate gets an additional benefit since he can use the campaigning to convince voters of his innocence, and so reduce the negative effects of the stigma associated with criminal charges. We test the implications of the model using data for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections in India, and find support for all the implications of the model. Our empirical results show that voters do penalise candidates with criminal charges; however, this negative effect is reduced if there are other candidates in the constituency with criminal charges; besides, the vote shares are positively related to candidate wealth, with the marginal effect being higher for the candidates with criminal charges.

Suggested Citation

  • Dutta, Bhaskar & Gupta, Poonam, 2012. "How Do Indian Voters Respond to Candidates with Criminal Charges : Evidence from the 2009 Lok Sabha Elections," MPRA Paper 38417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38417
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aidt, T. & Golden, M. A. & Tiwari, D., 2011. "Incumbents and Criminals in the Indian National Legislature," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1157, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Matthieu Chemin, 2008. "Do Criminals Politicians Reduce Corruption? Evidence from India," Cahiers de recherche 0825, CIRPEE.
    3. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
    4. Poonam Gupta & Arvind Panagariya, 2014. "Growth and Election Outcomes in a Developing Country," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 332-354, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Enriqueta Aragonès & Javier Rivas & Áron Tóth, 2019. "Voter Heterogeneity and Political Corruption," Working Papers 1121, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Sitakanta Panda, 2012. "Legislator characteristics and legislative outcomes in India," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3401-3416.
    3. Horacio A. Larreguy & John Marshall & James M. Snyder, Jr., 2014. "Revealing Malfeasance: How Local Media Facilitates Electoral Sanctioning of Mayors in Mexico," NBER Working Papers 20697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gupta, Poonam, 2013. "What do the Voters Reward: Personality, Party or Performance?," MPRA Paper 53795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Rivas, Javier & Tóth, Áron, 2020. "Voter heterogeneity and political corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 206-221.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; India;

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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