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A Note on the Determinants of AFDC Policies

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  • Cebula, Richard

Abstract

The purpose of this Note is to provide a model of the determinants of geographic AFDC differentials. In particular, the model developed and tested below hypothesizes a basically political determination of AFDC levels, a political determination principally involving an alignment of two socio-economic groups: (1) the very poor (actual AFDC recipients) and (2) those who are likely to become (although they are not currently actual) AFDC recipients.

Suggested Citation

  • Cebula, Richard, 1980. "A Note on the Determinants of AFDC Policies," MPRA Paper 51560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:51560
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Orr, Larry L, 1976. "Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application to AFDC," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 359-371, June.
    2. Richard Cebula, 1976. "A note on nonwhite migration, welfare levels, and the political process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 117-119, December.
    3. Cebula, Richard, 1978. "The Determinants of Human Migration," MPRA Paper 58401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting coalitions; welfare levels;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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