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Cumplimiento fiscal y bienes públicos: ¿Son realmente compatibles?
[Tax Compliance & Public Goods: Do they really get along?]

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  • Sour, Laura

Abstract

This work provides experimental evidence of the determinants of tax compliance in Mexico, and compares them to the results of an experiment administered in the United States reported by Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992). The results for both countries are contrasted to the predictions of the Alligham-Sandmo model, whose basic assumption is that the probability of being detected cheating taxes is exogenous and independent of the level and type of income reported. Specifically, in both experiments, increasing the probability of audit always increases compliance; higher penalty rates are ineffective to increase compliance; there is a negative relationship between tax rates and compliance; but there was free riding in the public goods sessions in Mexico, even when the government is efficient providing them.

Suggested Citation

  • Sour, Laura, 2006. "Cumplimiento fiscal y bienes públicos: ¿Son realmente compatibles? [Tax Compliance & Public Goods: Do they really get along?]," MPRA Paper 50447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50447
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax compliance; experiments; public goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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