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“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据
[The Political Promotion for Quasi-Government Officers: Evidence from Central State-owned Enterprises in China]

Author

Listed:
  • Yang, Ruilong
  • Wang, Yuan
  • Nie, Huihua

Abstract

Using political mobility data for 189 leaders from China’s central state-owned enterprise (CSOEs) in 2008-2011, for the first time this paper investigates the mechanism of political turnover for leaders as quasi-government officers in CSOEs. We find that: (1) the likelihood of promotion of these leaders increases with their economic performance measured as growth rate of operating revenue, while the likelihood of demotion decreases with their economic performance; (2) these leaders with CCP central committee member have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (3) these leaders with Ph.D. degree have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (4) compared to growth rate of operating revenue, growth rate of maintaining and increasing the value of state capital has no significant effect on promotion; (5) the compensation linked to position in CSOEs has no impact on leaders’ promotion, which indicates that leaders in CSOEs look more likely government officials rather than professional managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, Ruilong & Wang, Yuan & Nie, Huihua, 2012. "“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据 [The Political Promotion for Quasi-Government Officers: Evidence from Central State-owned Enterprises in China]," MPRA Paper 50317, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Sep 2013.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50317
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    state-owned enterprise; promotion; government officer; economic performance; guangxi;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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