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I currency board come strumento di stabilizzazione economica: come funzionano e dove sono adottati
[Currency boards as instrument for economic stabilisation: how they work and where they are adopted]

Author

Listed:
  • Cappiello, Antonio

Abstract

This paper describes the functioning of a currency board within the socio-economic context in which it operates. Special focus is given to the macroeconomic implications of a currency board system compared to a central bank system. In particular the author describes the principles regulating a currency board system (par.3), analyses the most relevant experiences on the adoption of a currency board (par. 5) and its advantages and problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Cappiello, Antonio, 2006. "I currency board come strumento di stabilizzazione economica: come funzionano e dove sono adottati [Currency boards as instrument for economic stabilisation: how they work and where they are adopte," MPRA Paper 4966, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4966
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4966/1/MPRA_paper_4966.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Ms. Anne Marie Gulde & Mr. Juha Kähkönen & Mr. Peter M Keller, 2000. "Pros and Cons of Currency Board Arrangements in the Lead-Up to EU Accession and Participation in the Euro Zone," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 2000/001, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    4. Corrinne Ho, 2002. "A survey of the institutional and operational aspects of modern-day currency boards," BIS Working Papers 110, Bank for International Settlements.
    5. Marie-Thérèse Camilleri Gilson, 2002. "Policy Pre-Commitment and Institutional Design: A Synthetic Indicator Applied to Currency Boards," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 330, OECD Publishing.
    6. Switgard Feuerstein & Oliver Grimm, 2006. "On the Credibility of Currency Boards," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 818-835, November.
    7. Mr. Alain Ize & Mr. Arto Kovanen & Timo Henckel, 1999. "Central Banking Without Central Bank Money," IMF Working Papers 1999/092, International Monetary Fund.
    8. John Hawkins & Paul Masson, 2003. "Economic aspects of regional currency areas and the use of foreign currencies," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Regional currency areas and the use of foreign currencies, volume 17, pages 4-42, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. John Williamson, 1995. "What Role of Currency Boards?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa40, April.
    10. Charles Goodhart, 1988. "The Evolution of Central Banks," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262570734, December.
    11. Stanley Fischer, 2001. "Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 3-24, Spring.
    12. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    13. Schwartz, Anna J., 1993. "Currency boards: their past, present, and possible future role," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 147-187, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Currency Boards; Monetary Policy; Central Banks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P24 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - National Income, Product, and Expenditure; Money; Inflation
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
    • P52 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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