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Математическая Модель Экономической Системы С Распределенными Правами Собственности
[A Mathematical Model of the Economic System with Distributed Property Rights]

Author

Listed:
  • Kolesnik, Georgiy

Abstract

A model of the economic system with the property rights distributed among several agents is considered. The effect of property rights allocation on the economic efficiency of the management strategies is studied.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolesnik, Georgiy, 2010. "Математическая Модель Экономической Системы С Распределенными Правами Собственности [A Mathematical Model of the Economic System with Distributed Property Rights]," MPRA Paper 47680, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 May 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:47680
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Müller, Holger M. & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999. "Inside vs Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 344, Stockholm School of Economics.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    4. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property rights; ownership; control; efficiency; welfare; competition; non-cooperative game; Nash equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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