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Assessing the Mumbai metropolitan region: a governance perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Pethe, Abhay
  • Gandhi, Sahil
  • Tandel, Vaidehi

Abstract

The paper written from a governance perspective takes the position that a useful governance perspective must be informed by the socio-economic-cultural milieu and in the specific Indian context must sit on a tripod of ‘political reality’, ‘state of decentralization’ and ‘basic economic principles’. Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) is one of the most important growth engines for India as it accrues tremendous revenues to the central and the Maharashtra (State) governments. It is thus crucial to ensure that the governance system in MMR is efficient for it to continue on its growth trajectory. We assess the performance of the governance system in MMR which resembles a polycentric governance system- a system that has been heralded as being greatly suited to metropolitan regions by several scholars. We recognize that Metropolitan governance is a concept since in reality it comprises a loose bundle of multiple actors and organizations. For sharper focus, we study the interactions between only two (dominant) public organizations- Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (an Urban Local Body of Greater Mumbai) and the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (a parastatal of the State Government). Our assessment reveals that the institutions – rules of the game – which are essential for the efficient functioning of polycentric governance system are missing in the region. Our findings emphasize the need to bring about micro reforms in the institutional framework for polycentric governance to be successful in MMR.

Suggested Citation

  • Pethe, Abhay & Gandhi, Sahil & Tandel, Vaidehi, 2011. "Assessing the Mumbai metropolitan region: a governance perspective," MPRA Paper 39354, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39354
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39354/1/MPRA_paper_39354.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krister Andersson & Elinor Ostrom, 2008. "Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 41(1), pages 71-93, March.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Incentives and Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248681.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pethe, Abhay & Tandel, Vaidehi & Gandhi, Sahil, 2012. "Unravelling the anatomy of legal corruption in India: Focusing on the ‘honest graft’ by the politicians," MPRA Paper 39306, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Conflict Resolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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