Profitability in Cournot and Bertrand Mixed Markets under Endogenous Objectives
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Cournot; Bertrand; endogenous objectives; partial privatization;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2012-01-10 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-01-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-01-10 (Industrial Organization)
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