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Voter Behavior and Seniority Advantage in Pork Barrel Politics

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  • Rodet, Cortney S.

Abstract

This paper uses experiments to explore electoral accountability in a legislative system that favors seniority. Voters face a trade-off between pork barrel transfers and policy representation. Term limits are tested as a mechanism to reduce the cost of searching for a legislator who better represents voters on policy, as well as reducing the resulting asymmetric distribution of income. Subjects’ preferences on abortion are used in an innovative means of capturing incumbents’ policy choices where subject legislators vote to determine whether a donation is allocated to either a pro-choice or pro-life foundation.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodet, Cortney S., 2011. "Voter Behavior and Seniority Advantage in Pork Barrel Politics," MPRA Paper 33192, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33192
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49862/9/MPRA_paper_49862.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rodet, Cortney S., 2011. "Fact Finding Trips to Italy: An experimental investigation of voter incentives," MPRA Paper 33193, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; legislature; term limits; experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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