IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/31988.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Wu, Haoyang

Abstract

This paper gives two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem," MPRA Paper 31988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31988
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31988/1/MPRA_paper_31988.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    2. Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle," MPRA Paper 30653, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation," MPRA Paper 30067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms," MPRA Paper 30072, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle," MPRA Paper 30653, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2005. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057238, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result," MPRA Paper 30068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Implemetation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Working Papers wp2007_0708, CEMFI.
    6. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    7. Axel Ockenfels, 2009. "Marktdesign und Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(s1), pages 31-53, May.
    8. Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 138-152.
    9. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    10. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    11. Eric S. Maskin, 2008. "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 567-576, June.
    12. Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation," MPRA Paper 30067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Eric Maskin, 2004. "The Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass," Economics Working Papers 0044, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    14. Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Subgame perfect implementation: A new result," MPRA Paper 30286, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quantum game theory; Algorithmic Bayesian mechanism; Revelation principle; Revenue equivalence theorem.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31988. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.