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Strategic manipulations and collusions in Knaster procedure: a comment

Author

Listed:
  • Corradi, Corrado
  • Corradi, Valentina

Abstract

The note examines the susceptibility of envy-free variants of Knaster procedure to manipulations and collusions .

Suggested Citation

  • Corradi, Corrado & Corradi, Valentina, 2010. "Strategic manipulations and collusions in Knaster procedure: a comment," MPRA Paper 28678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28678
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28678/1/MPRA_paper_28678.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007. "Bidder collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
    2. Sanchez, Francisco Sanchez, 2002. "About inheritance distribution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 297-309, July.
    3. Stephen J. Willson, 2003. "Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(2), pages 247-259, March.
    4. Raith, Matthias G., 2000. "Fair-negotiation procedures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 303-322, May.
    5. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
    6. Vito Fragnelli & Maria Erminia Marina, 2009. "Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(2), pages 143-153, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Steinhaus-Knaster procedure; auction; insincere bidding.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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