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The crisis and the raison d’être and prospect for the UK office for budget responsibility versus an economic supreme Court

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  • Colignatus, Thomas

Abstract

Each democratic nation with the Montesquieu Trias Politica separation of powers of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary branches of government is advised to create an Economic Supreme Court as a fourth branch. The new UK Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) falls short of that and will fail in scientific advice just like the US Council of Economic Advisors, the German Sachverständigenrat, the French Commissariat Général du Plan and the Dutch Centraal Planbureau. The OBR’s setup is likely to put the UK on a path of self-fulfilling forecasts of lower sustainable growth and higher unemployment than necessary. This paper is a small update of my 2005 book “Definition & Reality in the General Theory of Political Economy” (DRGTPE) with respect to the economic crisis since 2007. This paper also discusses aspects of the continued stagflation, the euro, investments and the environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Colignatus, Thomas, 2011. "The crisis and the raison d’être and prospect for the UK office for budget responsibility versus an economic supreme Court," MPRA Paper 27873, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 May 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27873
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 129-207, June.
    2. Thomas Cool, 1996. "Differential impact of the minimum wage on exposed and sheltered sectors," General Economics and Teaching 9608001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Thomas Colignatus, 2005. "Announcement of availability: "Definition & Reality in the General Theory of Political Economy" 2nd edition 2005," General Economics and Teaching 0502072, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Martin Hellwig, 2008. "The Causes of the Financial Crisis," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(04), pages 12-21, December.
    5. Colignatus, Thomas, 2009. "Consumer durables as investments that can help us out of the current economic crisis," MPRA Paper 13382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(2), pages 40-46, 07.
    7. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(02), pages 40-46, July.
    8. repec:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:2:p:14566986 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean Pisani-Ferry & Adam Posen, 2011. "From convoy to parting ways? Post-crisis divergence between European and US macroeconomic Policies," Working Papers 498, Bruegel.
    2. Colignatus, Thomas, 2011. "High Noon at the EU corral. An economic plan for Europe, September 2011," MPRA Paper 33476, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 May 2010.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; public choice; political science; credit crunch; economic crisis; office for budget responsibility; stagflation; euro;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General

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