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The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

Author

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  • Bonardi, Jean-Philippe
  • Urbiztondo, Santiago
  • Quelin, Bertrand

Abstract

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will regulatory convergence lead to positive outcomes for utility sectors? This paper attempts to provide new answers to these questions. Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple theoretical model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations in the telecommunications sector. We find support for the ideas (1) that once institutional factors are taken into account, one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation, and (2) this process will lead to very different results regarding the impact of regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonardi, Jean-Philippe & Urbiztondo, Santiago & Quelin, Bertrand, 2008. "The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities," MPRA Paper 14435, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14435
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    Cited by:

    1. Barun, Tereza, 2019. "Fixed Internet Access Regulatory Framework and its Influence on Firm's Strategic Decision Making," 7th International OFEL Conference on Governance, Management and Entrepreneurship: Embracing Diversity in Organisations (Dubrovnik, 2019), in: 7th International OFEL Conference on Governance, Management and Entrepreneurship: Embracing Diversity in Organisations. April 5th - 6th, 2019, Dubrovn, pages 298-318, Governance Research and Development Centre (CIRU), Zagreb.
    2. Boute, Anatole, 2012. "Promoting renewable energy through capacity markets: An analysis of the Russian support scheme," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 68-77.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulatory convergence; lobbying; utilities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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