Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely?: A Political Agency Theoretic Approach
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Power; Corruption; Hidden Action; Perception; Bolstering;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J47 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Coercive Labor Markets
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2024-07-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2024-07-08 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2024-07-08 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages)
- NEP-MIC-2024-07-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2024-07-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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