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The Optimal Taxation of Network Goods

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  • Hargaden, Enda
  • Hanson, Andrew
  • Harris, Matthew

Abstract

We derive optimal tax formulas for network goods. The solution trades-off contemporaneous revenue collection against the discounted future flows of reduced network growth. We provide conditions under which the optimal tax sequence is time-invariant, and show that the rates should in general change over time. A quantitative model with consumer heterogeneity highlights patterns in these optimal sequences, and underscores the equity trade-offs

Suggested Citation

  • Hargaden, Enda & Hanson, Andrew & Harris, Matthew, 2023. "The Optimal Taxation of Network Goods," MPRA Paper 118661, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:118661
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Finance; Optimal taxation; network goods; consumption externalities; atmospheric externalities.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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