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Self-Undermining Policy Feedback and Social Policy Making in Iraq

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  • Cerami, Alfio

Abstract

This article examines self-undermining policy feedback and social policy making in Iraq. It discusses Jacobs and Weaver's (2015), self-undermining feedback mechanisms which include: Mechanism 1) Self-undermining-feedback through emergent losses for individuals and for organized groups (eg. emergent costs); Mechanism 2) Policy losses in mass cognition for individuals and for organized groups (eg. negativity bias, framing effects, informational conditions); and Mechanism 3) Expanding menus of alternatives/menu effects of policies for individuals and for organized groups (eg. windows of political opportunity). In Iraq, governments implemented both policies of blame avoidance and of credit claiming that became “self-undermining over time” (Weaver 1986; Jacobs and Weaver 2015). In patronage and exclusionary politics associated with civil war or the war against terror, new pension entitlements, health care, protection against unemployment and social safety nets, which tend to reward special privileged categories or loyal ethnic groups, such as state officials and corrupt members of the security apparatuses might intentionally escalate tensions to increase their own profits. This have led in an increase in expenses for those programs that can become self-undermining over time and could block their dismissal, whilst decreasing the scope for later development and social policy improvements. Politics and policies have become in this way without dignity for the beneficiaries, since they became part of a clannish exclusionary tribal politics that rises expenses without resolving the conflict resolution problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Cerami, Alfio, 2023. "Self-Undermining Policy Feedback and Social Policy Making in Iraq," MPRA Paper 116381, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:116381
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Weaver, R. Kent, 1986. "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 371-398, October.
    2. Najat El Mekkaoui de Freitas & Hillary Johnson, 2012. "Formal and Informal Social Protection in Iraq," Working Papers 739, Economic Research Forum, revised 2012.
    3. Cerami, Alfio, 2015. "Social Protection and The Politics of Anger in the Middle East and North Africa," MPRA Paper 92272, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Giovanni Sartori, 1994. "Comparative Constitutional Engineering," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-22861-4.
    5. Cerami, Alfio, 2018. "The Lights of Iraq: Electricity Usage and the Iraqi War-fare Regime," MPRA Paper 87276, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Philipp Genschel & Hanna Lierse & Laura Seelkopf, 2016. "Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 290-315, April.
    7. Mayntz, Renate, 2003. "Mechanisms in the analysis of macro-social phenomena," MPIfG Working Paper 03/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Iraq; self-undermining policy feedback; political economy; ISIL (Da’esh); social policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O5 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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