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Public Governance and Political Corruption: A Framework for Anticorruption Policy

Author

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  • Glória Texeira

    (Faculty of Law, University of Porto, Centre for Legal and Economic Research)

  • Ary Ferreira da Cunha

    (Faculty of Law, University of Porto, Centre for Legal and Economic Research, Observatory of Economy and Management of Fraud)

Abstract

In this paper we propose a framework of policies against political corruption. Though we have frameworks explaining the causes of corruption – mainly based on agency theory – and though many authors have considered the role of good governance in fighting corruption or the effectiveness of different anticorruption policies, we see that these branches of literature have yet not entered in dialogue to construct a framework for curbing political corruption. The framework is based on the contributions of agency theory to the field of corruption over the past decades. After all, if discretion, information asymmetries and non-coincidence of interests are the elements of agency contributing to corruption they must also be the fundamentals targeted by anticorruption policies. Based on an extensive literature survey we gather a large array of good governance policies shown to be effective against political corruption and consider how they fit in the framework. This framework may help decision makers, policy advisors, and civil society stakeholders understand and visualize their options, contributing to the construction of more comprehensive strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Glória Texeira & Ary Ferreira da Cunha, 2015. "Public Governance and Political Corruption: A Framework for Anticorruption Policy," OBEGEF Working Papers 035, OBEGEF - Observatório de Economia e Gestão de Fraude;OBEGEF Working Papers on Fraud and Corruption.
    • Handle: RePEc:por:obegef:035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anticorruption Policy; Public Governance; Political Corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O29 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Other
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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