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Measuring market power in the Iberian electricity wholesale market through the residual demand curve

Author

Listed:
  • Vitor Marques

    (Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços Energéticos, Lisboa)

  • Isabel Soares

    (CETE, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)

  • Adelino Fortunato

    (Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra)

Abstract

The existence of market power in the electricity market is a recurrent issue. Measuring and understanding market power practices in the Iberian electricity market turn out to be interesting: though a liberalized market, two integrated firms control 80% of total demand and there is a strong - often direct - intervention of government in the market. For various reasons, among which the difficulty in obtaining reliable, extensive data stands out, market power in the Iberian electricity market has rarely been measured. This work aims to contribute to a better knowledge of the way market power occurs. We calculate the elasticity of residual demand to evaluate the two dominant firm’s market power, using hourly bides in the Spanish spot market for the period July-August 2004 to 2006. Although our approach was highlighted by Frank Wolak work on the electricity sector, we extend it and discuss its constraints. We discuss the results obtained in the light of the evolution of the electricity sector during that period.

Suggested Citation

  • Vitor Marques & Isabel Soares & Adelino Fortunato, 2008. "Measuring market power in the Iberian electricity wholesale market through the residual demand curve," CEF.UP Working Papers 0801, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  • Handle: RePEc:por:cetedp:0801
    as

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    File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/cete/papers/DP0801.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aitor Ciarreta & María Espinosa, 2010. "Market power in the Spanish electricity auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 42-69, February.
    2. Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005. "Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April.
    3. Aitor Ciarreta & María Paz Espinosa, 2006. "Demand Elasticity and Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Market," Working Papers 0606, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Jun 2006.
    4. Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, 2002. "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1376-1405, December.
    5. Baker, Jonathan B. & Bresnahan, Timothy F., 1988. "Estimating the residual demand curve facing a single firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 283-300.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Di Cosmo, Valeria & Lynch, Muireann Á., 2016. "Competition and the single electricity market: Which lessons for Ireland?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 40-47.
    2. Raúl Bajo-Buenestado & Dodge Cahan, 2015. "Unification of Oligopolistic Markets for a Homogeneous Good in the Presence of an Antitrust Commission," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 239-256, September.
    3. repec:ehu:dfaeii:6470 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Ciarreta, Aitor & Espinosa, María Paz, 2012. "The impact of regulation on pricing behavior in the Spanish electricity market (2002–2005)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 2039-2045.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market power; wholesale market; residual demand curve elasticity; government intervention;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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