The Political-Support View of Protection
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More about this item
Keywords
Political support f26ction; Protection For Sale; Cognitive Dissonance problem; Black Box problem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-POL-2011-09-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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