IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oxf/wpaper/675.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bidding for Network Size: Platform Competition when Quality and Network Size are Complements

Author

Listed:
  • Renaud Foucart
  • Jana Friedrichsen

Abstract

We study two platforms competing for members by investing in network quality. Quality is complementary to the network size: the marginal utility generated by an additional member increases with the network's quality. Platforms are imperfect substitutes: a share of the potential members are biased toward each of the platforms and some are indifferent ex ante. We assume that, in case of multiple equilibria, consumers use the investment in quality as a coordination device. We find that, in equilibrium, platforms randomize over two disconnected intervals of investment levels, corresponding to competing for either the entire population or the mass of ex-ante different members. While the "prize" of winning the competition for members is identical for both platforms, the value of the outside option "not investing" depends on a platform's share of ex-ante biased members. The platform with the smallest share of ex-ante biased members bids more aggressively to compensate for its lower outside option and achieves a monopoly network with higher probability than its competitor.

Suggested Citation

  • Renaud Foucart & Jana Friedrichsen, 2013. "Bidding for Network Size: Platform Competition when Quality and Network Size are Complements," Economics Series Working Papers 675, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:675
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e8faa07f-6ebb-4d3f-8082-97a6f13bfb6b
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1993. "A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(4), pages 941-964.
    2. Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Two‐sided markets: a progress report," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, September.
    3. Nicholas Economides, 1997. "The Economics of Networks," Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, vol. 1(0), December.
    4. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 209-223, Springer.
    5. Marc Rysman, 2009. "The Economics of Two-Sided Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 125-143, Summer.
    6. Oz Shy, 2011. "A Short Survey of Network Economics," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(2), pages 119-149, March.
    7. Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email:rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
    8. Bagwell, Kyle, 2007. "The Economic Analysis of Advertising," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1701-1844, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dietrich, Antje-Mareike, 2016. "Governmental platform intermediation to promote alternative fuel vehicles," Economics Department Working Paper Series 16, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
    2. Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff, 2014. "Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet driving competition or market monopolization?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 49-61, February.
    3. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, January.
    4. Dietrich, Antje-Mareike, 2017. "Platform intermediation to sponsor alternative fuel vehicles," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 90-99.
    5. Justus Haucap & Torben Stühmeier, 2016. "Competition and antitrust in Internet markets," Chapters, in: Johannes M. Bauer & Michael Latzer (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of the Internet, chapter 9, pages 183-210, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Kevin M. Murphy & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2016. "A Theory of Bundling Advertisements in Media Markets," NBER Working Papers 22994, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Justus Haucap, 2019. "Competition and Competition Policy in a Data-Driven Economy," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 54(4), pages 201-208, July.
    8. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 2013. "The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses," NBER Working Papers 18783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Lam, W., 2015. "Switching Costs in Two-sided Markets," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Jonathan Levin, 2011. "The Economics of Internet Markets," Discussion Papers 10-018, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    12. Marleen Marra, 2024. "Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry," Working Papers hal-03393068, HAL.
    13. Ginger Zhe Jin & Marc Rysman, 2015. "Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 704-735, December.
    14. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS
    15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Cantillon, Estelle & Yin, Pai-Ling, 2011. "Competition between exchanges: A research agenda," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 329-336, May.
    17. Anderson, Simon P. & Gabszewicz, Jean J., 2006. "The Media and Advertising: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets," Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, in: V.A. Ginsburgh & D. Throsby (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 567-614, Elsevier.
    18. Nicholas Economides & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 2015. "The strategic use of download limits by a monopoly platform," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 297-327, June.
    19. Mika Kato, 2016. "Jean Tirole, Nobel Prize Winner," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(1), pages 23-44, January.
    20. Oz Shy, 2011. "A Short Survey of Network Economics," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(2), pages 119-149, March.
    21. Marchand, André & Hennig-Thurau, Thorsten, 2013. "Value Creation in the Video Game Industry: Industry Economics, Consumer Benefits, and Research Opportunities," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 141-157.
    22. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Stephen Martin, 2017. "Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(2), pages 95-118, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Internet; Platforms; Investment; Network Effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:675. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Anne Pouliquen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfeixuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.