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Stock Options and Employees' Firm-Specific Human Capital under the Threat of Divesture and Aquisition

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  • Hiroshi Osano

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  • Hiroshi Osano, 2001. "Stock Options and Employees' Firm-Specific Human Capital under the Threat of Divesture and Aquisition," Working Papers 01-10, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:osu:osuewp:01-10
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    File URL: http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/pdf/osano/01-10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stein, Jeremy C, 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February.
    2. Lichtenberg, Frank R. & Siegel, Donald, 1990. "The effects of leveraged buyouts on productivity and related aspects of firm behavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 165-194, September.
    3. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:1:p:41-57 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jeremy C. Stein, 1989. "Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 655-669.
    5. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 33-68, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 1996. "Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 163-181, January.
    7. Bagwell, Laurie Simon & Zechner, Josef, 1993. "Influence Costs and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 975-1008, July.
    8. Kaplan, Steven, 1989. "The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 217-254.
    9. Berglof, Erik & Perotti, Enrico, 1994. "The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 259-284, October.
    10. Alan J. Auerbach, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number auer88-1.
    11. Chang, Saeyoung & Mayers, David, 1992. "Managerial vote ownership and shareholder wealth *1: Evidence from employee stock ownership plans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 103-131, August.
    12. Ippolito, Richard A & James, William H, 1992. "LBOs, Reversions and Implicit Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 139-167, March.
    13. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1998. "Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 219-239, February.
    14. Kaplan, Steven N. & Minton, Bernadette A., 1994. "Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 225-258, October.
    15. Boot, Arnoud W A, 1992. "Why Hang on to Losers? Divestitures and Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1401-1423, September.
    16. Brown, David T & Ryngaert, Michael D, 1991. "The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: Taxes and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 653-669, June.
    17. Aoki, Masahiko, 1989. "The nature of the Japanese firm as a nexus of employment and financial contracts: An overview," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 345-366, December.
    18. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:2:p:785-798 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Jaggia, Priscilla Butt & Thakor, Anjan V, 1994. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Optimal Capital Structure," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 283-308, May.
    20. Knoeber, Charles R, 1986. "Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 155-167, March.
    21. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G. & Ruback, Richard S., 1992. "Does corporate performance improve after mergers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 135-175, April.
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