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Peasant economy in the edebate on Japanese capitalism f: Tenancy contract facing the eTurning point f

Author

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  • Masaki Nakabayashi

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

Abstract

Japanese economy was losing its stability in the interwar period. Faced with the challenge, Moritaro Yamada gave an understanding that the stability of Japanese political economy before the First World War had been maintained by paternalistic institutions both of agricultural and industrial sectors, not based on thoroughly modern market mechanism. This then influential observation can still be supported by the classical dual economy model. However, as a scholar in the period of institutional change, Yamada failed to rightly predict the direction of change. While Yamada expected the change should lead to impersonal market mechanism, the real history showed people rather built a planned economy during the war and recovered stability. Yamada fs mistake was mainly in that he underestimated the significance of risk sharing in the paternalist organizations. At the gturning point h where labor changed into scarce resource from surplus resource, two vectors with opposite directions could exist. Riskier opportunities for higher wages would encourage people to accept market mechanism based on impersonal exchange. Dissolution of risk sharing in paternalistic organizations would make people call for the sate taking on the role as a large welfare state. In Japan, especially in the middle of the Great Depression, the latter factor became dominant.

Suggested Citation

  • Masaki Nakabayashi, 2008. "Peasant economy in the edebate on Japanese capitalism f: Tenancy contract facing the eTurning point f," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0813
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    File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0813.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Toya, Tetsuro, 2006. "The Political Economy of the Japanese Financial Big Bang: Institutional Change in Finance and Public Policymaking," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199292394 edited by Amyx, Jennifer A..
    2. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, 2004. "Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582481, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Peasant economy; tenancy contract; risk sharing; institutional change.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N35 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Asia including Middle East
    • N55 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Asia including Middle East

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