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Liberalism, rationality, and Pareto optimality

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  • Heap, Shaun Hargreaves
  • Ismail, Mehmet

Abstract

Rational players in game theory are neoliberal in the sense that they can choose any available action so as to maximize their payoffs. It is well known that this can result in Pareto inferior outcomes (e.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma). Classical liberalism, in contrast, argues that people should be constrained by a no-harm principle (NHP) when they act. We show, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, that rational players constrained by the NHP will produce Pareto efficient outcomes in n-person non-cooperative games. We also show that both rationality and the NHP are required for this result.

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  • Heap, Shaun Hargreaves & Ismail, Mehmet, 2021. "Liberalism, rationality, and Pareto optimality," SocArXiv mgqh7, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:mgqh7
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/mgqh7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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