IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/2kbas.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Informational Lobbying and Implementation Standards

Author

Listed:
  • Blumenthal, Benjamin

Abstract

Policymakers are often uncertain about the right course of action. To inform their decisions, policymakers might rely on information provided by interest groups (IGs). Given that their interests are often misaligned, IGs might under-provide information to policymakers. This paper explores the possibility for policymakers of committing to implementation standards prior to IGs’ lobbying, to induce more information transmission. I show that setting implementation standards ex-ante can benefit policymakers, despite possible ex-post inefficiencies, by inducing informational lobbying in cases in which IGs would not have lobbied with implementation standards set ex-post. I discuss implications of these results for constitutional design, legislative politics, and bureaucratic politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Blumenthal, Benjamin, 2024. "Informational Lobbying and Implementation Standards," SocArXiv 2kbas, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:2kbas
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/2kbas
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/660c3222943bee1097dfec85/
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/2kbas?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clement Minaudier, 2022. "The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 570-612.
    2. Hao Li, 2001. "A Theory of Conservatism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 617-636, June.
    3. Austen-Smith, David, 1998. "Allocating Access for Information and Contributions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 277-303, October.
    4. Ian R Turner, 2019. "Political Agency, Oversight, and Bias: The Instrumental Value of Politicized Policymaking," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 544-578.
    5. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Li Hao & Wing Suen, 2009. "Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 359-392, May.
    2. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    3. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    4. Patty, John & Turner, Ian R, 2024. "Strange Bedfellows: How the Need for Good Governance Shapes Budgetary Control of Bureaucracy," OSF Preprints pnx2u, Center for Open Science.
    5. John Morgan & Felix Várdy, 2011. "On the buyability of voting bodies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 260-287, April.
    6. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
    7. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Tim Baldenius & Xiaojing Meng & Lin Qiu, 2021. "The value of board commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 1587-1622, December.
    9. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
    10. Mireille Chiroleu‐Assouline & Thomas P. Lyon, 2020. "Merchants of doubt: Corporate political action when NGO credibility is uncertain," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 439-461, April.
    11. Shapiro, Jesse M., 2016. "Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 91-108.
    12. Cotton, Christopher, 2015. "Competing for Attention," MPRA Paper 65715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Thomas Choate & John A Weymark & Alan E Wiseman, 2020. "Legislative bargaining and partisan delegation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 289-311, April.
    14. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning more by doing less," Working Papers 2012-1, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    15. Boris Knapp, 2021. "Fake Reviews and Naive Consumers," Vienna Economics Papers 2102, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    16. Battaglini, Marco & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi, 2019. "The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 55-76, February.
    17. Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2022. "Improving Information from Manipulable Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 79-115.
    18. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2008. "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 905-925, December.
    19. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3mdje1f65o8qrqpapnmrhon2vm is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2000. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-16, March.
    21. Carrillo, Juan & Brocas, Isabelle, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:2kbas. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.