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The System of Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Transfers in China

Author

Listed:
  • Xiao Wang

    (OECD)

  • Richard Herd

    (OECD)

Abstract

The main features of China’s current sub-national finance arrangements date back to the 1994 tax reform. China has a multi-level government structure that shares national tax revenues through a system of tax sharing and transfers, and divides spending assignments and responsibilities. Local governments have hardly any discretionary power to modify taxation, though they have some non-tax revenue from fees, levies and penalties. They can also spend the profit from the sale of land-use rights subject to central government restrictions. As the 1994 tax reform recentralised revenues and decision-making power, vertical gaps between revenue and expenditure at sub-national levels have grown. In order to accommodate this, the central government has raised the scale of transfers. Over the past decade, China’s transfer policy has addressed the horizontal imbalances and become markedly more redistributive. Nevertheless, fiscal disparities within provinces remain high and are much greater than between regions in OECD countries. The extent of fiscal equalisation within provinces varies, thus affecting the delivery of services. The government’s plan to equalise service provision across the country therefore calls for fine-tuning the transfer system and improving local revenue. Some local governments are testing a residential property tax but not in a form that would substantially raise tax revenue. A significant property tax would tend to lower the revenue from the sale of land-use rights and would, in general, improve the fiscal position of those local governments that already have strong budgets. This Working Paper relates to the 2013 OECD Economic Survey of China (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/china) Le système de partage des recettes et des transferts budgétaires en Chine Les principales caractéristiques des accords de financement infranationaux actuels en Chine remontent à la réforme fiscale de 1994. La Chine possède une structure administrative à plusieurs niveaux qui partage les recettes fiscales nationales par le biais d'un système de répartition des recettes fiscales et de transferts, et qui attribue les missions et responsabilités en matière de dépense. Les collectivités locales n'ont guère de pouvoir discrétionnaire afin de modifier la fiscalité, même si elles collectent des recettes non fiscales provenant de divers droits, prélèvements et amendes. Elles peuvent aussi dépenser les recettes provenant de la vente de droits d'usage des terrains sous réserve de restrictions imposées par le gouvernement central. Comme la réforme fiscale de 1994 a centralisé de nouveau les recettes et le pouvoir de décision, les déséquilibres verticaux entre recettes et dépenses au niveau infranational se sont accentués. Afin d'en tenir compte, le gouvernement central a augmenté le volume des transferts. Au cours de la décennie passée, la politique des transferts en Chine a répondu aux déséquilibres horizontaux et est devenue nettement plus redistributive. Néanmoins, les disparités fiscales au sein des provinces demeurent élevées et sont beaucoup plus grandes qu'entre régions des pays de l'OCDE. Le degré de péréquation au sein des provinces varie, ce qui affecte la prestation de services. Afin d’égaliser cette dernière dans tout le pays, le plan du gouvernement appelle donc à peaufiner le système de transferts et à améliorer les recettes locales. Certaines autorités locales sont en train de tester un impôt foncier résidentiel, mais pas sous une forme qui permettrait d'augmenter considérablement les recettes fiscales. Un impôt foncier important aurait tendance à réduire les recettes provenant de la vente de droits d'usage des terrains et, plus généralement, améliorerait la situation financière des administrations locales déjà dotées de solides budgets. Ce Document de travail a trait à l’Étude économique de l’OCDE de la Chine, 2013 (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/chine).

Suggested Citation

  • Xiao Wang & Richard Herd, 2013. "The System of Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Transfers in China," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1030, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1030-en
    DOI: 10.1787/5k4bwnwtmx0r-en
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mr. Philippe Wingender, 2018. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Reform in China," IMF Working Papers 2018/088, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Yihua Yu & Jing Wang & Xi Tian, 2016. "Identifying the Flypaper Effect in the Presence of Spatial Dependence: Evidence from Education in China's Counties," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 93-110, March.
    3. Das-Gupta, Arindam, 2014. "Fiscal Resources for Inclusive Growth," ADB Economics Working Paper Series 416, Asian Development Bank.
    4. Tang, Peng & Feng, Yue & Li, Min & Zhang, Yanyan, 2021. "Can the performance evaluation change from central government suppress illegal land use in local governments? A new interpretation of Chinese decentralisation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    5. Mr. Waikei R Lam & Mr. Philippe Wingender, 2015. "China: How Can Revenue Reforms Contribute to Inclusive and Sustainable Growth?," IMF Working Papers 2015/066, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Pedro Naso Author name: Tim Swanson, 2017. "How Does Environmental Regulation Shape Economic Development? A Tax Competition Model of China," CIES Research Paper series 54-2017, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    7. Chan, Felix & Petchey, Jeff, 2017. "A note on the relation between fiscal equalization and economic growth," MPRA Paper 79156, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. van der Kamp, Denise & Lorentzen, Peter & Mattingly, Daniel, 2017. "Racing to the Bottom or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 164-176.
    9. Jing Xing & Clemens Fuest, 2018. "Central-local government fiscal relations and cyclicality of public spending: evidence from China," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(4), pages 946-980, August.
    10. Jorge Pablo Puig & Alberto Porto, 2021. "On the interaction between own revenues and intergovernmental transfers. Evidence from Argentinean local governments," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4508, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    11. Jia, Junxue & Ding, Siying & Liu, Yongzheng, 2020. "Decentralization, incentives, and local tax enforcement," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    12. Ms. Sonali Jain-Chandra & Niny Khor & Rui Mano & Johanna Schauer & Mr. Philippe Wingender & Juzhong Zhuang, 2018. "Inequality in China – Trends, Drivers and Policy Remedies," IMF Working Papers 2018/127, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Yongzheng Liu & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Baoyun Qiao, 2014. "Falling Short: Intergovernmental Transfers in China," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1423, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    14. Alberto Porto & Jorge Puig, 2021. "On the interaction between own revenues and intergovernmental transfers. Evidence from Argentinean local governments," CEFIP, Working Papers 041, CEFIP, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    15. Long KE, 2015. "A Study on China fs Social Safety Institution and Income Disparity," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 11(1), pages 205-230, March.
    16. Samuel Marden, 2016. "The agricultural roots of industrial development: ‘forward linkages’ in reform era China," Working Paper Series 09116, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    17. Samuel Marden, 2016. "The agricultural roots of industrial development: ‘forward linkages’ in reform era China," Working Paper Series 9116, Department of Economics, University of Sussex.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    China; Chine; collectivités locales; disparités fiscales; droits d'usage des terrains; finances publiques; fiscal disparities; impôt foncier; intergovernmental transfers; land-use rights; local government; property taxation; public finances; répartition des recettes fiscales; service equalisation; tax sharing; transferts intergouvernementaux; égalisation service;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H27 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other Sources of Revenue
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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