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An Impossibility Theorem for Deterministic Organizations

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  • Jean-Marie Blin
  • Mark A. Satterthwaite

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  • Jean-Marie Blin & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1975. "An Impossibility Theorem for Deterministic Organizations," Discussion Papers 129, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:129
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kramer, Gerald H, 1973. "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 285-297, March.
    2. Kalai, Ehud & Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1976. "Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(2), pages 233-240, March.
    3. Mark Allen Satterthwaite, 1973. "The Existence of a Strategy Proof Voting Procedure," Discussion Papers 42, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Theodore Groves, 1974. "Information, Incentives and the Internalization of Production Externalities," Discussion Papers 87, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
    6. David Schmeidler & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1974. "The Possibility of a Cheatproof Social Choice Function: A Theorem of A. Gibbard and M. Satterthwaite," Discussion Papers 89, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1973. "Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 934-946, September.
    8. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "On the revelation of preferences for public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 79-93, August.
    9. Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, 1974. "An Incentive Mechanism for Efficient Resource Allocation in General Equilibrium with Public Goods," Discussion Papers 119, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    11. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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