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Cooperation by Indirect Revelation Through Strategic Behavior

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  • Robert Lapson

Abstract

The paper deals with a one-shot prisoners' dilemma when the players have an option to go to court but cannot verify their testimonies. To solve the problem a second stage is added to a game. At the first stage the players are involved in the prisoners' dilemma and at the second stage they play another game in which their actions are verifiable. In such a setup the information about the actions chosen at the prisoners' dilemma stage can be revealed through strategic behavior of the players during the second stage. A mechanism for such revelation in the extended game is described. It provides an existence of a unique sequential equilibrium, which may be obtained by an interative elimination of dominated strategies and has a number of desirable properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Lapson, 1993. "Cooperation by Indirect Revelation Through Strategic Behavior," Discussion Papers 1036, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven J. Brams, 1975. "Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(4), pages 596-612, December.
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