Networks and Markets. The dynamic impacts of information, matching and transaction costs on trade
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More about this item
Keywords
Repeated trade; Moral hazard; Matching; Transaction costs; Networks; Institutions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
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