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Bandwidth Allocation in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks

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Abstract

We present a model of bandwidth allocation in a stylized peer-to-peer file sharing network. Given an arbitrary population of peers composed of sharers and freeriders, where all peers interconnect to maximize their allocated bandwidth, we derive the expected bandwidth obtained by sharers and freeriders. We show that sharers are always better off than freeriders and that the di®erence decreases as the size of the network grows. This paper constitutes a first step towards providing a general analytical foundation for resource allocation in peer-to-peer networks.

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  • Albert Creus Mir & Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Andres Hervas-Drane, 2006. "Bandwidth Allocation in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks," Working Papers 06-23, NET Institute, revised Oct 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0623
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Atip Asvanund & Karen Clay & Ramayya Krishnan & Michael D. Smith, 2004. "An Empirical Analysis of Network Externalities in Peer-to-Peer Music-Sharing Networks," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 15(2), pages 155-174, June.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    3. Cunningham, Brendan M. & Alexander, Peter J. & Adilov, Nodir, 2004. "Peer-to-peer file sharing communities," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 197-213, June.
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    Keywords

    Peer-to-Peer; Network formation; Resource allocation; Congestion;
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