A Brazilian Debt-Crisis Model
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- Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2002. "A Brazilian Debt-Crisis Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 3541, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Duo Qin & Marie Anne Cagas & Geoffrey Ducanes & Nedelyn Magtibay-Ramos & Pilipinas F. Quising, 2005. "Empirical Assessment of Sustainability and Feasibility of Government Debt: The Philippines Case," Working Papers 527, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAM-2002-09-21 (Central and South America)
- NEP-RMG-2002-09-28 (Risk Management)
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