Congressional Vote Options
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- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 2005. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization," Scholarly Articles 3448676, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization," NBER Working Papers 7388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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