The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: PE
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:4:p:823-39 is not listed on IDEAS
- Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
- Brian J. Hall, 1996. "Regulatory Free Cash Flow and the High Cost of Insurance Company Failure," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1782, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- James, Christopher, 1991. "The Losses Realized in Bank Failures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1223-1242, September.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Brian J. Hall, 1998. "Regulatory Free Cash Flow and the High Cost of Insurance Company Failures," NBER Working Papers 6837, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Ernest Dautovic, 2019.
"Has Regulatory Capital Made Banks Safer? Skin in the Game vs Moral Hazard,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie
19.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Dautović, Ernest, 2020. "Has regulatory capital made banks safer? Skin in the game vs moral hazard," Working Paper Series 2449, European Central Bank.
- Dautović, Ernest, 2019. "Has regulatory capital made banks safer? Skin in the game vs moral hazard," ESRB Working Paper Series 91, European Systemic Risk Board.
- Episcopos, Athanasios, 2008. "Bank capital regulation in a barrier option framework," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1677-1686, August.
- Choi, Dong Beom & Eisenbach, Thomas M. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2021.
"Watering a lemon tree: Heterogeneous risk taking and monetary policy transmission,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
- Dong Beom Choi & Thomas M. Eisenbach & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2015. "Watering a lemon tree: heterogeneous risk taking and monetary policy transmission," Staff Reports 724, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Loveland, Robert, 2016. "How prompt was regulatory corrective action during the financial crisis?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 16-36.
- Guillaume Vuillemey, 2015. "Derivatives markets : from bank risk management to financial stability [Les marchés de dérivés : gestion des risques bancaires et stabilité financière]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03507099, HAL.
- Suarez, Javier & Mendicino, Caterina & Nikolov, Kalin, 2017.
"Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mendicino, Caterina & Nikolov, Kalin & Suarez, Javier, 2017. "Equity versus bail-in debt in banking: an agency perspective," ESRB Working Paper Series 50, European Systemic Risk Board.
- Caterina Mendicino & Kalin Nikolov & Javier Suarez, 2017. "Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective," Working Papers wp2017_1712, CEMFI.
- International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2020. "Evaluation of Differential Premium Systems for Deposit Insurance," IADI Research Papers 20-06, International Association of Deposit Insurers.
- George Pennacchi, 1999. "The Effects of Setting Deposit Insurance Premiums to Target Insurance Fund Reserves," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 153-180, December.
- Douglas Gale & Piero Gottardi, 2017.
"Equilibrium Theory of Banks' Capital Structure,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
6580, CESifo.
- Piero Gottardi & Douglas Gale, 2017. "Equilibrium Theory of Banks' Capital Structure," 2017 Meeting Papers 380, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- GALE, Douglas; GOTTARDI, Piero, 2017. "Equilibrium theory of banks’ capital structure," Economics Working Papers ECO2017/02, European University Institute.
- Kane, Edward J., 1995. "Three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 431-459, June.
- Mendicino, Caterina & Nikolov, Kalin & Suarez, Javier, 2017.
"Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Caterina Mendicino & Kalin Nikolov & Javier Suarez, 2017. "Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective," Working Papers wp2018_1712, CEMFI.
- Caterina Mendicino & Kalin Nikolov & Javier Suarez, 2017. "Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective," Working Papers wp2017_1712, CEMFI.
- Mendicino, Caterina & Nikolov, Kalin & Suarez, Javier, 2017. "Equity versus bail-in debt in banking: an agency perspective," ESRB Working Paper Series 50, European Systemic Risk Board.
- James G. Bohn & Brian Hall, 1999. "The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers," NBER Chapters, in: The Financing of Catastrophe Risk, pages 363-390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frederic Malherbe, 2020.
"Optimal Capital Requirements over the Business and Financial Cycles,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 139-174, July.
- Malherbe, Frederic, 2015. "Optimal capital requirements over the business and financial cycles," Working Paper Series 1830, European Central Bank.
- Malherbe, Frédéric, 2015. "Optimal capital requirements over the business and financial cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 10387, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Frederic Malherbe, 2015. "Optimal Capital Requirements over the Business and Financial Cycles," 2015 Meeting Papers 1154, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Scheepens, J.P.J.F., 1994. "Financial intermediations, bank failure and official assistance," Other publications TiSEM 3519e91e-2830-489e-befa-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Gropp, Reint & Guettler, Andre, 2018.
"Hidden gems and borrowers with dirty little secrets: Investment in soft information, borrower self-selection and competition,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 26-39.
- Gropp, Reint & Gruendl, Christian & Guettler, Andre, 2013. "Hidden gems and borrowers with dirty little secrets: investment in soft information, borrower self-selection and competition," Working Paper Series 1555, European Central Bank.
- Gropp, Reint E. & Gruendl, Christian & Guettler, Andre, 2013. "Hidden gems and borrowers with dirty little secrets: Investment in soft information, borrower self-selection and competition," SAFE Working Paper Series 19, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Weiß, Gregor N.F. & Bostandzic, Denefa & Neumann, Sascha, 2014. "What factors drive systemic risk during international financial crises?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 78-96.
- Akhigbe, Aigbe & Madura, Jeff & Marciniak, Marek, 2012. "Bank capital and exposure to the financial crisis," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 64(5), pages 377-392.
- Peter Nigro & Kevin Jacques, 2000. "Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 149-164, August.
- Douglas Gale, 2015. "Regulation and Sausages," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83, pages 1-26, December.
- Fischer, Klaus P. & Fournier, Eric M., 2002. "Does Corporate Governance Matter in Deposit Insurance? DI and Moral Hazard in Joint Stock and Mutual Financial Intermediaries," Cahiers de recherche 0206, CIRPEE.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5911. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.