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Does Corporate Governance Matter in Deposit Insurance? DI and Moral Hazard in Joint Stock and Mutual Financial Intermediaries

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  • Fischer, Klaus P.
  • Fournier, Eric M.

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the differences of effects of a deposit insurance schemes on financial cooperative and joint stock banks risk taking. We develop a methodology which includes the specifics of the utility function for the financial cooperative and we compare the results to a similar profit maximizing joint stock bank. We find that the introduction of deposit insurance does in fact increase optimal risk level for the financial cooperative but less so than the stock bank. Thus, corporate governance does matter in the level of risk exposure of a deposit insurance scheme. Further, like in joint stock banks, this moral hazard can be curbed through incentives such as risk adjusted premias, risk adjusted regulatory capital and possibly reserve requirements.

Suggested Citation

  • Fischer, Klaus P. & Fournier, Eric M., 2002. "Does Corporate Governance Matter in Deposit Insurance? DI and Moral Hazard in Joint Stock and Mutual Financial Intermediaries," Cahiers de recherche 0206, CIRPEE.
    • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nedelchev, Miroslav, 2010. "Корпоративно Управление На Финансови Групи (Спазвай И Обяснявай) [Corporate Governance of Financial Groups (Comply and Explain)]," MPRA Paper 52249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully & Braga, Marcelo José & Bressan, Aureliano Angel & Resende Filho, Moisés de Andrade, 2012. "O seguro depósito induz ao risco moral nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras? Um estudo com dados em painel," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 66(2), June.
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