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Implementing Market Access

Author

Listed:
  • Kala Krishna
  • Suddhasatwa Roy
  • Marie Thursby

Abstract

The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms to the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the implementation procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves between government and firms is highlighted by focusing on taxes and subsidies to implement minimum market share requirements. Both taxes and subsidies chosen by the home government after firms have picked prices create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices - effects that are similar in nature to those found with quotas/VERs. We show that some degree of imprecision in implementing the target engenders less anticompetitive outcomes relative to perfect enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie Thursby, 1996. "Implementing Market Access," NBER Working Papers 5593, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5593
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Krishna, K & Thursby, M & Roy, S, 1996. "Implementing Market Access," Papers 96-011, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
    • Krishna, K & Roy, S & Thursby, M, 1996. "Implementaing Market Access," Papers 96-003, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    12. Thursby, M. & Krisna, K. & Roy, S., 1997. "Procompetitive Market Access," Papers 97-006, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
    13. Neil Bjorksten, 1994. "Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 446-457, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Krishna, Kala & Morgan, John, 1998. "Implementing results-oriented trade policies: The case of the US-Japanese auto parts dispute," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(8), pages 1443-1467, September.
    2. Thierry Verdier, 1998. "Results-oriented versus rules-oriented trade policies:: A theoretical survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 733-744, May.
    3. Byron Gangnes & Craig Parsons, 2007. "Have US–Japan Trade Agreements Made a Difference?," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 548-566.
    4. Craig Parsons, 2005. "The Effect Of The Semiconductor Trade Agreement On Japanese Firms," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 50(01), pages 117-129.
    5. Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie Thursby, 2001. "Can subsidies for MARs be procompetitive?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(1), pages 212-224, February.
    6. Thursby, M. & Krisna, K. & Roy, S., 1997. "Procompetitive Market Access," Papers 97-006, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
    7. Ju, Jiandong & Krishna, Kala, 2000. "Welfare and market access effects of piecemeal tariff reform," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 305-316, August.
    8. Spencer, Barbara J & Qiu, Larry D, 2001. "Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier to Trade?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 871-901, November.
    9. Greaney, Theresa M., 2000. "Righting past wrongs: can import promotion policies counter hysteresis from past trade protection in the presence of switching costs?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 211-227, September.
    10. Qiu, Larry D. & Spencer, Barbara J., 2002. "Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment: implications for market-opening trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 49-79, October.
    11. Greaney, Theresa M., 2001. "Promoting Imports to Appease Trade Partners: Japan's New Trade Policies," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 253-270, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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