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Information Spillovers, Margins, Scale and Scope: With an Application to Canadian Life Insurance

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  • Jeffrey I. Bernstein

Abstract

This paper develops a model of the production of life insurance services. The focus is on price setting ability and the cost advantages from size and diversity. The model characterizes insurers decisions on the face value and number of policies and the number of insurance lines. The model is applied to Canadian life insurance firms. Price-cost margins average from 13% to 40%. These margins emanate from information spillovers generated by marketing activities. Cost advantages due to size are small, but are substantial from diversity. Returns to scale average from 1.13 to 1.40, while returns to scope average from 70% to 100%.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey I. Bernstein, 1992. "Information Spillovers, Margins, Scale and Scope: With an Application to Canadian Life Insurance," NBER Working Papers 3979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3979
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Killins, Robert N., 2020. "Firm-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors of life insurers’ profitability: Evidence from Canada," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    2. Fukuyama, Hirofumi, 1997. "Investigating productive efficiency and productivity changes of Japanese life insurance companies," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 481-509, September.
    3. Jeffrey I. Bernstein, 1999. "Total factor productivity growth in the Canadian life insurance industry: 1979-1989," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(2), pages 500-517, April.
    4. Jon Breslaw & James McIntosh, 1997. "Scale Efficiency in Canadian Trust Companies," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 281-292, August.
    5. Andrew C. Worthington & Emily V. Hurley, 2000. "Technical, allocative and cost efficiency in the Australian general insurance industry," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 074, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.

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