IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/31310.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Carbon Border Adjustments, Climate Clubs, and Subsidy Races When Climate Policies Vary

Author

Listed:
  • Kimberly A. Clausing
  • Catherine Wolfram

Abstract

Jurisdictions adopt heterogeneous climate policies that vary both in terms of ambition and in terms of policy approach, with some jurisdictions pricing carbon and others subsidizing clean production. We distinguish two types of policy spillovers associated with diverse policy approaches to climate change. First, when countries have different levels of climate ambition, free-riders will benefit at the expense of more committed countries. Second, when countries pursue different approaches, carbon-intensive producers within cost-imposing jurisdictions will be at a relative competitive disadvantage compared with producers in subsidizing jurisdictions. Carbon border adjustments and climate clubs are attempts to respond to these policy spillovers, but when countries have divergent policy approaches, one policy alone will not be able to address both types of spillovers. We also consider the policy dynamics that result from carbon border adjustments and climate clubs; both have the potential to encourage upward harmonization of climate policy, but they come with risks. Further, the pressures of international competition in the presence of divergent climate policy approaches may result in subsidy races, which come with their own potential risks and benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Kimberly A. Clausing & Catherine Wolfram, 2023. "Carbon Border Adjustments, Climate Clubs, and Subsidy Races When Climate Policies Vary," NBER Working Papers 31310, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31310
    Note: EEE ITI PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w31310.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Clausing Kimberly & Cramton Peter & Ockenfels Axel & Wolfram Catherine, 2024. "Strategic Climate Cooperation and Greenhouse Gas Price Coordination," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Sciendo, vol. 59(1), pages 55-56, February.
    2. Campolmi, Alessia & Fadinger, Harald & Forlati, Chiara & Stillger, Sabine & Wagner, Ulrich, 2023. "Designing Effective Carbon Border Adjustment with Minimal Information Requirements. Theory and Empirics," CEPR Discussion Papers 18645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2024. "Principles for Pareto Efficient Border Carbon Adjustment," CESifo Working Paper Series 11016, CESifo.
    4. Christoph Böhringer & Knut Einar Rosendah & Halvor Briseid Storrøsten, "undated". "Measures against carbon leakage. Combining output-based allocation with consumption taxes," Discussion Papers 1013, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    5. repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_495 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.