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From Lapdogs to Watchdogs: Random Auditor Assignment and Municipal Fiscal Performance

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  • Silvia Vannutelli

Abstract

A fundamental question in organizational economics is how to structure organizations to better align incentives across levels. While monitoring could mitigate agency problems, it can itself be rendered ineffective if auditors are corruptible. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of changes in the design of monitoring institutions that limit auditors' conflicts of interest. I exploit the staggered introduction of a reform that removed the control of auditors' appointment from local politicians and introduced a random assignment mechanism. I obtain four main findings. First, random matching severs auditors-mayors connections. Second, treated municipalities significantly improve their net surpluses and debt repayments, per national government objectives. Third, the fiscal improvement results from a sizeable increase in tax capacity. Fourth, treatment effects are a combination of selection, matching, and incentive effects. These findings highlight the value of auditor independence and illustrate how changes in the organizational design of the state can improve governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Vannutelli, 2022. "From Lapdogs to Watchdogs: Random Auditor Assignment and Municipal Fiscal Performance," NBER Working Papers 30644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30644
    Note: CF DEV LE PE POL
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    Cited by:

    1. Bergeaud, Antonin & Mazet-Sonilhac, Clément & Malgouyres, Clément & Signorelli, Sara, 2021. "Technological Change and Domestic Outsourcing," IZA Discussion Papers 14603, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Claudio Detotto & Riccardo Marselli & Bryan C. McCannon & Marco Vannini, 2024. "Experts and arbitration outcomes: Insights from public procurement contract disputes," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 922-943, November.
    3. Sultan Mehmood, 2021. "The impact of Presidential appointment of judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?," Working Papers halshs-03161933, HAL.
    4. Niklas Potrafke, 2023. "The Economic Consequences of Fiscal Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 10765, CESifo.
    5. Réka Juhász & Nathan Lane, 2024. "The Political Economy of Industrial Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 11143, CESifo.
    6. Sultan Mehmood, 2021. "The impact of Presidential appointment of judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?," AMSE Working Papers 2118, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    7. Daniele, Federica & Pasquini, Alessandra & Clò, Stefano & Maltese, Enza, 2023. "Unburdening regulation: The impact of regulatory simplification on photovoltaic adoption in Italy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing

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