IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/26098.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Federal Reserve Structure, Economic Ideas, and Monetary and Financial Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Michael D. Bordo
  • Edward S. Prescott

Abstract

The decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System is evaluated as a mechanism for generating and processing new ideas on monetary and financial policy. The role of the Reserve Banks starting in the 1960s is emphasized. The introduction of monetarism in the 1960s, rational expectations in the 1970s, credibility in the 1980s, transparency, and other monetary policy ideas by Reserve Banks into the Federal Reserve System is documented. Contributions by Reserve Banks to policy on bank structure, bank regulation, and lender of last resort are also discussed. We argue that the Reserve Banks were willing to support and develop new ideas due to internal reforms to the FOMC that Chairman William McChesney Martin implemented in the 1950s. Furthermore, the Reserve Banks were able to succeed at this because of their private-public governance structure, a structure set up in 1913 for a highly decentralized Federal Reserve System, but which survived the centralization of the System in the Banking Act of 1935. We argue that this role of the Reserve Banks is an important benefit of the Federal Reserve’s decentralized structure by allowing for more competition in ideas and reducing groupthink.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael D. Bordo & Edward S. Prescott, 2019. "Federal Reserve Structure, Economic Ideas, and Monetary and Financial Policy," NBER Working Papers 26098, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26098
    Note: ME PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w26098.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. anonymous, 2000. "What assets should the Federal Reserve buy? 2000 annual report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond," Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    2. Renee Courtois Haltom & Jeffrey M. Lacker, 2014. "Should the Fed Do Emergency Lending?," Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue July.
    3. Peter Conti-Brown, 2016. "The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10576.
    4. John H. Kareken, 1983. "Deposit insurance reform or deregulation is the cart, not the horse," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 7(Spr).
    5. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2006. "How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail? A Review of Gary Stern and Ron Feldman's Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 988-1004, December.
    6. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    7. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    8. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
    9. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
    10. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
    11. Litterman, Robert B, 1986. "Forecasting with Bayesian Vector Autoregressions-Five Years of Experience," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 4(1), pages 25-38, January.
    12. Robert L. Hetzel & Ralph F. Leach, 2001. "After the accord : reminiscences on the birth of the modern Fed," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 57-64.
    13. Rik Hafer, 1999. "Against the tide: Malcolm Bryan and the introduction of monetary aggregate targets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 84(Q1), pages 20-37.
    14. Litterman, Robert, 1986. "A statistical approach to economic forecasting : Robert B. Litterman, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 4 (1986) 1-4," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 497-498.
    15. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, April.
    16. Douglas Evanoff & Philip Bartholomew & Robert DeYoung & Cosmin Lucaci & Ronnie Phillips, 2008. "Bank Structure Conference Impact Study," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 34(2), pages 99-121, December.
    17. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    18. Charles Calomiris & David Wheelock, 1998. "Was the Great Depression a Watershed for American Monetary Policy?," NBER Chapters, in: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, pages 23-65, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    20. Friedman, Milton, 1986. "Economists and Economic Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 1-10, January.
    21. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-441, November.
    22. Marvin Goodfriend, 2007. "How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 47-68, Fall.
    23. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    24. Michael D. Bordo & Athanasios Orphanides, 2013. "The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bord08-1.
    25. Karl Brunner & Allan H. Meltzer, 1968. "What Did We Learn from the Monetary Experience of the United States in the Great Depression?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 1(2), pages 334-348, May.
    26. Marvin Goodfriend & Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1999. "Limited commitment and central bank lending," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 1-27.
    27. Gregory C. Chow, 1966. "On the Long-Run and Short-Run Demand for Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(2), pages 111-111.
    28. Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195101133.
    29. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    30. Hetzel,Robert L., 2008. "The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521881326, January.
    31. Brimmer, Andrew F, 1989. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 3-16, Spring.
    32. Litterman, Robert, 1986. "Forecasting with Bayesian vector autoregressions -- Five years of experience : Robert B. Litterman, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 4 (1986) 25-38," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 497-498.
    33. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael D. Bordo & Andrew T. Levin & Mickey D. Levy, 2020. "Incorporating Scenario Analysis into the Federal Reserve’s Policy Strategy and Communications," NBER Working Papers 27369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jan C. van Ours, 2022. "How Retirement Affects Mental Health, Cognitive Skills and Mortality; an Overview of Recent Empirical Evidence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-050/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Michael D. Bordo & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2023. "Federal Reserve Structure and the Production of Monetary Policy Ideas," Working Papers 23-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Michael D. Bordo & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2022. "Federal Reserve Structure and Economic Ideas," Working Papers 22-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael D. Bordo & Edward S. Prescott, 2023. "Federal Reserve Structure and the Production of Monetary Policy Ideas," NBER Working Papers 31915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, January.
    3. Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777.
    4. Joon-Ho Hahm & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Causes of the Korean Financial Crisis: Lessons for Policy," NBER Working Papers 7483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Mishkin, F.S., 1998. "International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes," Papers 648, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    6. Frederic S. Mishkin, 1998. "The Dangers of Exchange‐Rate Pegging in Emerging‐Market Countries," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 81-101, October.
    7. Robert L. Hetzel, 2008. "What is the monetary standard, or, how did the Volcker-Greenspan FOMCs tame inflation?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 94(Spr), pages 147-171.
    8. Alesina, Alberto & Stella, Andrea, 2010. "The Politics of Monetary Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 18, pages 1001-1054, Elsevier.
    9. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "What should central banks do?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 82(Nov), pages 1-14.
    10. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2020. "More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 87-105.
    11. Martin, Fernando M., 2015. "Debt, inflation and central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 129-150.
    12. Christoph S. Weber, 2020. "The unemployment effect of central bank transparency," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2947-2975, December.
    13. Berlemann, Michael & Hielscher, Kai, 2009. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 89/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    14. Alex Cukierman, 1998. "The Economics of Central Banking," International Economic Association Series, in: Holger C. Wolf (ed.), Contemporary Economic Issues, chapter 3, pages 37-82, Palgrave Macmillan.
    15. Arthur J. Rolnick, 1993. "Market disciplines as a regulator of bank risk," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 37, pages 96-110.
    16. Mahir Binici & Yin-Wong Cheung & Kon S. Lai, 2011. "Trade Openness, Market Competition, and Inflation: Some Sectoral Evidence from OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 3690, CESifo.
    17. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January.
    18. Luis Jácome & Francisco Vázquez, 2005. "Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," Macroeconomics 0508011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Cukierman, Alex, 2011. "Reflections on the crisis and on its lessons for regulatory reform and for central bank policies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 26-37, January.
    20. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B0 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26098. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.